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OPINION OF THE COURT
                        
RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
The plaintiffs in this special education case, Patrick P., a
minor child, and his parents, Rita and Michael P., appeal the
District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant,
the West Chester Area School District (“District”).  The
plaintiffs made claims under the Individuals with Disabilities in
Education Act (“IDEA”), § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the District denied
Patrick a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”) and
3violated the IDEA’s child-find obligations.  The District Court
granted summary judgment to the District and applied the
IDEA’s two-year statute of limitations, which took effect on
July 1, 2005, to the IDEA claims.  It applied Pennsylvania’s
two-year personal injury statute of limitations to the § 504
claims.  The District cross-appeals, arguing that the IDEA’s
statute of limitations should apply to the § 504 claims.  We will
affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the
District, but will not reach the IDEA statute of limitations issue.
We disagree with the District Court’s application of
Pennsylvania’s personal injury statute of limitations to the
plaintiffs’ § 504 claims, and hold that the federal IDEA statute
of limitations applies to those claims. 
I.  Background
A.  The IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act 
The IDEA requires that institutions receiving federal
education funding provide a free and appropriate public
education (“FAPE”) to disabled children.  20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(a)(1).  A school district provides a FAPE by designing
and implementing an individualized instructional program set
forth in an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”), which “must
be reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive
meaningful educational benefits in light of the student’s
intellectual potential.”  Shore Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ. v.
P.S., 381 F.3d 194, 198 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).  The school district must conduct an
evaluation of the student’s needs, assessing all areas of
suspected disability, before providing special education and
4related services to the child.  20 U.S.C. § 1414(b).  
The IDEA also requires that a state have a system in
place to identify, locate, and evaluate all children in the state
who have disabilities and need special education and related
services.  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3); 34 C.F.R. § 300.111(a).
Pennsylvania codifies its “child find” duties at 22 Pa. Code. §§
14.121-14.125.   
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794,
prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by programs
that receive federal funds.  Under § 504, recipients of federal
funds must “provide a free appropriate public education to each
qualified handicapped person who is in the recipient’s
jurisdiction, regardless of the nature or severity of the person’s
handicap.”  34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a).  The claims in this case made
under § 504 are parallel to the IDEA claims.
In December of 2004, Congress passed amendments to
the IDEA, which had an effective date of July 1, 2005.  The
previous version of the IDEA did not have a statute of
limitations.  The amendments, which we will refer to as “IDEA-
2004,” included an explicit two-year statute of limitations:
A parent or agency shall request an impartial due process
hearing within 2 years of the date the parent or agency
knew or should have known about the alleged action that
forms the basis of the complaint, or, if the State has an
explicit time limitation for requesting such a hearing
under this subchapter, in such time as the State law
allows.
520 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C).  Pennsylvania does not have a
separate explicit time limitation for these types of claims.  Prior
to IDEA-2004, we had held that there was no federal statute of
limitations for compensatory education claims, in Ridgewood
Board of Education v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 1999).  In
Bernardsville Board of Education v. J.H., 42 F.3d 149 (3d Cir.
1994), we held that there was a one- to two-year statute of
limitations for tuition reimbursement claims.
IDEA-2004 includes two exceptions to the statute of
limitations period.  The two-year period does not apply when the
parent was prevented from requesting a due process hearing
because of either:
(i) specific misrepresentations by the local educational
agency that it had resolved the problem forming the basis
of the complaint; or
(ii) the local educational agency’s withholding of
information from the parent that was required under this
subchapter to be provided to the parent.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D).  
B.  Facts
The plaintiffs—Rita and Michael P. and their son Patrick,
who was 11 years old at the time the complaint was filed—live
within the boundaries of the District, but Patrick has never
attended public school.  During the 2001-2005 school years,
when he was in kindergarten through third grade, Patrick went
6to a parochial school, St. Maximillian Kolbe (“St. Max”).
During the summer of 2005, and in the 2005-2006 school year,
when he was in fourth grade, he attended the Benchmark School
(“Benchmark”), a private school for children with disabilities.
The District is obligated under the IDEA to identify and
locate children who need special education services.  It puts
annual notices in the general circulation newspaper that inform
parents about the availability of evaluations and the procedures
for making an evaluation request, including that requests must
be in writing, that there must be written consent to evaluate, and
that there are timelines for requesting due process.  The District
provides the same information on its website and over public
access television, and puts posters and pamphlets with this
information in both District school buildings and in private
schools within the District.  Homeowners receive this
information in their property tax bills.  The District also trains
principals and staff at private schools about the referral
processes and child find issues.  During the time relevant to the
plaintiff’s case, the Pennsylvania Department of Education
found that the District was 100% compliant with its child find
obligations.  
According to the plaintiffs, Rita P. first requested that
Patrick be evaluated for special education services in January of
2003, after he had shown problems with reading in kindergarten.
Based on his kindergarten teacher’s recommendation, Patrick
received Title I reading services from the Chester County
Intermediate Unit during his first grade year, in 2002 and 2003.
Title I is designed to help students reach state academic
achievement levels; private school students are guaranteed these
7services under 20 U.S.C. § 6301.  
Rita P. claims that in early 2003 she contacted Carol
Gaspar, the St. Max guidance counselor, and Michele McCann,
then the District Supervisor of Special Education, seeking
evaluation for Patrick.  The plaintiffs contend that Ms. Gaspar
contacted District Psychologist Virginia Sutton about Patrick,
and personally delivered referral documents to the District in
April of 2003.  As noted below, these individuals have denied
that these contacts occurred.  Carol Gaspar, the guidance
counselor assigned to St. Max, testified that she had no
recollection of any 2003 letter from the plaintiffs requesting
evaluation, and no copy of the letter.  Rita P. could not produce
a copy of the letter, either.  Virginia Sutton, the school
psychologist who facilitated non-public school referrals in the
relevant part of the District, had no record of any conversation
with any of the plaintiffs or any documentation regarding
Patrick, despite what the Appeals Panel called her
“extraordinarily thorough and meticulous record-keeping
system.”  (App. 665.)  As we will discuss further below, we
agree with the Hearing Officer, the Appeals Panel, and the
District Court that the District did not receive notice of Patrick’s
need to be evaluated in early 2003. 
The plaintiffs privately retained a psychologist, Dr. Tracy
Burke, who evaluated Patrick in April of 2003 and found that he
had difficulties with reading, reading comprehension, written
expression, and visual-motor integration.  In June of 2003, a
vision evaluator determined that Patrick needed vision therapy.
He received vision therapy and Title I reading services through
his second-grade year.
8On November 22, 2004, during Patrick’s third-grade
year, the plaintiffs wrote directly to the District requesting an
evaluation of Patrick and informing the District that a private
evaluator, Dr. Lisi Levisohn, was expected to evaluate Patrick’s
eligibility for special education services on December 14, 2004.
Susan Amsterdam, a District psychologist, interpreted the letter
to be a request for eligibility evaluation, and on November 29,
2004, the District sent two forms to the parents:  a Release of
Records form and a Parent Input form.  The release informed the
plaintiffs that there would be an information-gathering process
before the District issued the Permission to Evaluate form
(“PTE”) and that the District’s receipt of the signed form would
start the clock on the timeline to complete the evaluation. The
plaintiffs filled out and returned the forms to the District,
enclosing a copy of Dr. Burke’s evaluation of Patrick.  
On December 17, 2004, the District sent copies of the
releases to the guidance counselor at St. Max and to Dr.
Levisohn.  In mid- to late January of 2005, the District
assembled a Child Study Team to determine whether to issue a
PTE.  The PTE was issued on February 2, 2005, 72 calendar
days after the date of the plaintiff’s November 22, 2004, letter.
Dr. Amsterdam, the District psychologist, suggested to
the plaintiffs that they not sign the initial PTE, since it would
have to be amended once Dr. Levison’s private evaluation of
Patrick was complete.  She assured the plaintiffs that it would
not take long to send out a new form.  They did not sign the
initial PTE.  Dr. Levisohn sent Dr. Amsterdam a list of the
evaluation measures she had used, and noted that her report was
not yet finished.  Dr. Amsterdam decided not to issue a new PTE
9until the District had Dr. Levisohn’s complete report, which it
received on April 5, 2005.  Dr. Levisohn found that Patrick
qualified for special education services because he was both
Learning Disabled and Mentally Gifted.  On April 7, 2005, the
District sent a revised PTE, which the parents signed and mailed
back on April 11, 2005, 64 days after the first form was mailed.
The form instructed the plaintiffs that the District had 60 school
days to complete its evaluation of Patrick.  The District began
testing Patrick in early June of 2005.
Before the District began testing Patrick, on the advice of
Dr. Levisohn, the plaintiffs visited the Benchmark School.  They
liked the school, and applied for the 2005-2006 school year.
The early admissions process required the plaintiffs to declare
Patrick’s candidacy for the fall term by April 21, 2005, and in
the spring of 2005, the plaintiffs asked teachers at St. Max to
complete questionnaires required by Benchmark and went to a
family interview.  In late May or early June of 2005, Benchmark
accepted Patrick for both the 2005 summer program and for the
2005-2006 school year.  In early June, the plaintiffs sent a
tuition deposit to Benchmark.  They financed the Benchmark
tuition through AMS, a program that fronts the entire year’s
tuition to a private school and requires that parents repay the
bank on a monthly basis, with limited opportunity for parents to
opt out of full payment if their child does not attend the private
school.  
In July of 2005, the District completed testing Patrick and
produced a preliminary Evaluation Report (“ER”), which it sent
to the family.  On August 19, 2005, the plaintiffs wrote to
dispute the draft ER, because it did not identify a specific
 The Hearing Officer found that Patrick had performed1
at the “average” level during the math portion of his evaluation
by Dr. Levisohn, despite becoming dizzy and not being familiar
with some of the types of problems.  He was not doing poorly in
math at St. Max.  Neither the District nor Dr. Levisohn
performed social or emotional assessments because his parents
reported that Patrick was happy, social, and responsible, and Dr.
Levisohn found him to be pleasant, joyful, and engaging.  His
teachers described him as positive and motivated.  See App.
646-47.
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learning disability in Math Computation and did not include
assessments of Patrick’s social and emotional function.   The1
plaintiffs also informed the District that Patrick would enroll at
Benchmark for the 2005-2006 school year, and that they had “no
alternative” because the District’s IEP would not be offered
until after the beginning of the school year.  (App. 545.)
The District finalized the report and sent it to the family
on September 1, 2005, before the beginning of the school year.
The report incorporated many of Dr. Levisohn’s findings, and
identified a specific learning disability in Written Expression
and Reading.  Although Dr. Levisohn had not recommended
occupational therapy, the District’s report included such a
recommendation.  
The school year began on September 6, 2005.  Patrick
attended Benchmark.  On September 8 or 9, 2005, the plaintiffs
received an invitation from the District to participate in an IEP
meeting.  On September 13, 2005, the Individualized Education
11
Program team met to develop an IEP.  At that meeting, Rita P.
signed the revised September 1, 2005, ER.  The IEP the District
developed provided for occupational therapy and small group
direct instruction for Language Arts, Math, and Gifted Needs.
It also addressed Patrick’s spelling and keyboard skills and
noted that he qualified for enrollment in the gifted program.
The IEP included a long list of annual goals for Patrick and
specific instructions on how his progress was to be measured, in
addition to specially designed instruction and program
modifications.  The plaintiffs did not approve the IEP.
C.  The Administrative Process and the District
Court’s Decision
The plaintiffs filed a due process complaint on October
5, 2005, alleging claims under the IDEA, § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and the Pennsylvania School Code.  They
sought compensatory education for the alleged child find
violations during the 2002-2003 and 2004-2005 school years
and for an alleged denial of a FAPE, payment for an
Independent Educational Evaluation (“IEE”) for the due process
hearing, reimbursement for the two previous IEEs,
reimbursement for vision therapy in 2003 and 2004, and tuition
reimbursement for Patrick’s time at Benchmark in the summer
of 2005 and the 2005-2006 school year.
The Hearing Officer limited the IDEA and § 504 claims
to those arising after October 5, 2003, applying the IDEA-
2004’s two-year statute of limitations.  She concluded that the
District fulfilled its child find obligations and that the District’s
ER and IEP were appropriate, and that the parents were not
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entitled to compensatory education between October 2003 and
May 3, 2005, reimbursement for vision therapy, or tuition
reimbursement.  The Hearing Officer awarded 102 hours of
compensatory education for the period from May 4, 2005 to
June 21, 2005, on the theory that if the District had been more
prompt about its evaluation and IEP, a FAPE should have been
available to Patrick on May 4, 2005, and his parents could have
transferred him to a public school in the District for the last six
weeks of the school year. 
Both the plaintiffs and the District filed exceptions before
the Appeal Panel.  The panel held that the Hearing Officer had
erred in awarding compensatory education because it is not an
available remedy for private school students who are placed
there unilaterally by their parents.  See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.137,
300.138.  The panel wrote that 
[t]he record in its entirety compels a conclusion contrary
to the decision of the Hearing Officer.  The Hearing
Officer based her decision as to compensatory education
on facts not in evidence (i.e., that the student could have
been enrolled in the public school during that period)
and, contrary to evidence presented and testimony given.
The letter to the District in November as well as the
Parent’s testimony clearly demonstrates the Parents were
not planning to move the Student to the District until at
least the 2005-2006 year. . . . Therefore, because the
Student was enrolled in a private school, and not in the
District, and because the clear testimony indicates that
even if the District had completed the evaluation in a
timely manner, the Student would have remained in the
13
private school leads this panel to the conclusion that
compensatory education is not available.
(App. 683.)  The panel affirmed the rest of the Hearing Officer’s
decision.
The plaintiffs then filed this federal case seeking reversal
of the two prior decisions and adding a § 1983 claim.  On May
30, 2008, the District Court granted the District’s Motion for
Disposition on the Administrative Record and for Summary
Judgment.  The court granted summary judgment for the District
on the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims, citing our decision in A.W. v.
Jersey City Public Schools, 486 F.3d 791, 803, 805-06 (3d Cir.
2007), in which we held that § 1983 is not an available remedy
for violations of the IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act, because
both statutes have sufficiently comprehensive remedial schemes.
Like the Hearing Officer and the Appeal Panel, the District
Court applied the IDEA-2004 two-year statute of limitations to
the plaintiffs’ claims, barring any claims arising before October
5, 2003, two years before the plaintiffs requested a due process
hearing.  It concluded that the District did not violate its child
find obligations, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to
compensatory education or tuition reimbursement. The District
Court denied the District’s request to apply IDEA-2004’s statute
of limitations to the § 504 claims, instead applying
Pennsylvania’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations.
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II.  Discussion
A.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The plaintiffs made claims under the IDEA, § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and § 1983.  The district court had
jurisdiction under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) and 28 U.S.C. §
1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
As discussed above, this case came to the District Court
after the parents filed a due process complaint before a Hearing
Officer; both parties filed exceptions to the officer’s decision
and the case went to a Special Education Appeals Panel.  The
parents then filed a federal complaint.  In reviewing a dispute
brought under the IDEA’s administrative process, a district court
gives “due weight” and deference to the findings in the
administrative proceedings.  Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 206 (1982).  We have described this “due weight” standard
as “modified de novo” review.  S.H. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist.
of the City of Newark, 336 F.3d 260, 269-70 (3d Cir. 2003).
“Factual findings from the administrative proceedings are to be
considered prima facie correct,” and if the reviewing court does
not adhere to those findings, it is “‘obliged to explain why.’”  Id.
at 270 (citation omitted).  Under the two-tier special education
system in place at the time this case was going through the
administrative process, district courts owe more deference to the
findings of the Appeals Panel than to those of the Hearing
 Pennsylvania has now transitioned to a single-tier2
administrative process; hearing officers provide all state-level
review.
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Officer.   Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 529-30 (3d2
Cir. 1995).  
The statute of limitations claims and the plaintiffs’ claims
for compensatory education and tuition reimbursement are
subject to plenary review as conclusions of law.  The other
issues—whether the family proved an exception to the IDEA-
2004 statute of limitations, and whether the District fulfilled its
FAPE obligations—are subject to clear error review as questions
of fact.  See S.H., 336 F.3d at 271.  The plaintiffs cite Wexler v.
Westfield Board of Education, 784 F.2d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 1986),
for the proposition that the application of the IDEA’s
requirements to a student’s medical and educational needs is a
mixed question of law and fact, but our later precedent makes it
clear that “[t]he issue of whether an IEP is appropriate is a
question of fact.”  Carlisle, 62 F.3d at 526.
B.  Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act Statute of
Limitations
This case poses an issue of first impression:  whether
IDEA-2004’s two-year statute of limitations should apply to
parallel claims under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  Section
504 does not have its own statute of limitations. 
The District Court applied Pennsylvania’s two-year
16
personal injury statute of limitations to the plaintiffs’ § 504
claims, citing the strong preference for importing an analogous
state statute of limitations when federal statutes do not include
an express statute of limitations.  DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983); Haggerty v. USAir, Inc.,
952 F.2d 781, 783 (3d Cir. 1992).  The District argues that the
District Court erred when it applied the personal injury statute
of limitations to those claims; it says that the court should have
imported the two-year statute of limitations from IDEA-2004.
The District acknowledges that prior to the passage of the IDEA
amendments in 2004 the use of the personal injury limitations
period was appropriate, but argues that the IDEA is so
analogous to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act that the IDEA’s
limitations period should apply.  A court may borrow a
limitations period from an analogous federal law where that law
“clearly provides a closer analogy than the available state
statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the
practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more
appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking.”  DelCostello,
462 U.S. at 172; see also United Steel Workers of Am. v. Crown
Cork & Seal Co., 32 F.3d 53, 56-57 (3d Cir. 1994), aff’d sub
nom. N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29 (1995).  
The IDEA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act do similar
statutory work.  The IDEA protects the rights of disabled
children by mandating that public educational institutions
identify and effectively educate those children, or pay for their
education elsewhere if they require specialized services that the
public institution cannot provide.  Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act is parallel to the IDEA in its protection of
disabled students:  it protects the rights of disabled children by
17
prohibiting discrimination against students on the basis of
disability, and it has child find, evaluation, and FAPE
requirements, like the IDEA.   The Rehabilitation Act is
certainly closer in subject matter and goals to the IDEA than to
the Pennsylvania personal injury statute, which deals with torts
against person and property.  
While we have held that similarity between federal
statutes is not enough to justify applying the statute of
limitations from one statute to claims made under the other, see
Kingvision Pay-Per-View, Corp. v. 898 Belmont, Inc., 366 F.3d
217, 222 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he desire to unify the limitations
periods of federal laws with similar purposes is not a sufficient
reason to adopt federal limitations periods.”), the “existence and
availability of a more sharply focused federal analogue” is an
important consideration.  Rossiter v. Potter, 357 F.3d 26, 33 (1st
Cir. 2004).  Here, we consider whether to apply a general state
personal injury limitations period to claims made under a federal
statute with very specific goals, when Congress has recently
acted to include a statute of limitations in a federal statute with
very similar goals.  See Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory
Construction 702 (2003 rev. ed.) (“When two or more statutes
of limitations deal with the same subject matter, the statute
which is more recent and specific will prevail over the older and
more general one.”).  We also note that there are few federal
statutes as closely related, and under which such similar claims
may be brought, as the IDEA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.
As the District Court pointed out, we “take seriously the
Supreme Court’s admonition that analogous state statutes of
18
limitations are to be used unless they frustrate or significantly
interfere with federal polices.”  Crown Cork, 32 F.3d at 57.
Here, we fear that applying the state statute of limitations could
frustrate federal policy in certain situations.  The IDEA has two
specific exceptions to the statute of limitations:  the limitations
period does not apply if a parent was prevented from requesting
a due process hearing because of either (1) specific
misrepresentations by the school that it had resolved the
problem, or (2) the school’s withholding of statutorily required
information from the parent.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D).  There
are no such exceptions to the Pennsylvania statute of limitations
period for personal injury claims.  In addition, tolling principles
that affect the application of state statutes of limitations would
presumably not affect the IDEA statute of limitations, with its
express exceptions to the limitations period.  
In this case, the plaintiffs make child find and FAPE
claims under both the IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act.  All of
the plaintiffs’ § 504 claims are premised on their IDEA
claims—they make no separate claim of disability
discrimination under § 504.  It does not make sense that the
virtually identical claims made under these two statutes would
be treated differently from a statute-of-limitations perspective:
Congress has expressed an interest in promptly resolving
disputes under the IDEA, as evidenced by its passage of the
statute-of-limitations amendment.  If a plaintiff was barred from
asserting an IDEA claim because the statute of limitations had
run and neither of the exceptions applied, why should the
identical claim, made under the Rehabilitation Act, be subject to
different tolling principles?
19
We are convinced that the IDEA’s limitations period is
a better fit for education claims made under the Rehabilitation
Act than the personal injury statute of limitations.  Although it
appears that none of our sister circuits have faced this issue,
district courts confronting the issue have concluded that claims
for education under the Rehabilitation Act should be governed
by the IDEA’s statute of limitations.  See, e.g., Bell v. Bd. of
Educ of Albuquerque Pub Sch., No. 06-1137, 2008 WL
4104070, at *24 (D.N.M. Mar. 26, 2008) (holding that the
IDEA’s limitations period applies to Rehabilitation Act claims
where all claims are for education and there are no pure
discrimination claims made under the Rehabilitation Act). 
The statute of limitations from the IDEA provides a
“closer analogy” to the Rehabilitation Act than Pennsylvania’s
personal injury statute of limitations.  Under DelCostello, “the
federal policies at stake and the practicalities of litigation make
that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for interstitial
lawmaking.”  462 U.S. at 172.  Therefore, we hold that the
IDEA’s two-year statute of limitations applies to claims made
for education under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
C.  The District’s Obligations under the IDEA and the
Rehabilitation Act
Next, we address whether the District Court was correct
that the District satisfied the requirements of the IDEA and the
Rehabilitation Act in its identification and evaluation of Patrick
for special education services.  
 At oral argument, the plaintiffs argued that the Chester3
County Intermediate Unit, which provided Patrick with Title I
services at St. Max, should be considered an agent of the
District and its knowledge of Patrick’s need for Title I services
should be imputed to the District and considered notice of a
need for evaluation under the IDEA.  The plaintiffs did not raise
this issue before the District Court; although their briefs on
appeal mention that Patrick got Title I services from the CCIU,
20
    1.  The Plaintiffs’ Claims Before November 22, 2004
The plaintiffs claim that they initially sought services for
Patrick in early 2003.  As we discussed above, there is no
evidence in the record, apart from the testimony of Rita P., to
support this assertion. The Hearing Officer found that Rita P.’s
claim that she had initiated the evaluation process in January of
2003 was not credible:  she could not provide a copy of the letter
she claims she wrote, and numerous District and school
employees with whom she claimed to speak have no records of
their conversations.  The Hearing Officer found that Dr.
Virginia Sutton, the school psychologist who worked with all
non-public school referrals in the District, had no record of any
conversation with either parent or documentation referring to
Patrick, despite maintaining an “extraordinarily thorough and
meticulous record-keeping system.”  (App. 642.)  The Appeals
Panel and the District Court accepted this finding, and we will
not disturb the findings of the Hearing Officer that the District
did not have notice of Patrick’s need to be evaluated until it
received Rita P.’s November 22, 2004, letter.  We will consider
only those claims arising after that date.3
oral argument was the first time they argued that the CCIU was
an agent of the District.  As this argument was not properly
raised, we will not consider it.  
21
    2.  Timeliness of Evaluation
The plaintiffs allege that there was an unlawful delay
between the parents’ request for an evaluation of Patrick and the
completion of the process.  The Hearing Officer ordered 102
hours of compensatory education as an equitable remedy for the
time the family had to wait for the District’s evaluation process
to be completed.   The Hearing Officer called the District’s
delay “egregious” and said that the District denied Patrick the
possibility of receiving a FAPE for May and June 2005.  
The District acknowledges the delay but argues that it
was due to the parents’ seeking a private IEE.  Further, the
District contends, the delay was harmless, because it made no
difference in the parents’ decision to keep Patrick in private
school—Rita P. testified that the plaintiffs did not intend to
move Patrick from St. Max during the 2004-2005 school year.
The Appeals Panel agreed with the District and reversed
the Hearing Officer’s award of compensatory education, finding
that the “record read in its entirety compels a conclusion
contrary to the decision of the Hearing Officer” because the
record showed that there was no way Patrick would have gone
to public school until the 2005-2006 school year, and
compensatory education should only have been awarded if the
record showed that, if the evaluation had been timely, the
22
parents would have transferred him to the District.  (App. 683.)
The District Court found that the District took an “unduly
long time to complete its evaluation,” but that the evaluation
was substantively appropriate and that a procedural violation
alone cannot support a compensatory education award.  See 20
U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(ii); Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 35 v. Mr.
R., 321 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2003) (“We recognize that
compensatory education is not an appropriate remedy for a
purely procedural violation of the IDEA”); Erickson v.
Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 119 F.3d 1116, 1122-23 (10th Cir.
1999) (“The district court properly found that compensatory
education is not an appropriate remedy for a procedural
violation of the IDEA.”).  We agree with the District Court.
While the delay in evaluating Patrick was unfortunate, the
record does not show that the delay had any impact in the
plaintiffs’ decision to keep Patrick at St. Max for the 2004-2005
school year.  
    3.  Child Find Obligations
School districts have a continuing obligation under the
IDEA and § 504 to identify and evaluate all students who are
reasonably suspected of having a disability under the statutes.
Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 253.  The Hearing Officer, the Appeals
Panel, and the District Court all concluded that the District did
not violate its child find obligations.  The plaintiffs’ argument
rests primarily on their unproven allegation that they first
provided notice to the District in January of 2003.  As we said
above, we will not disturb the findings of the Hearing Officer,
Appeals Panel, and District Court that the District did not have
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notice of Patrick’s need to be evaluated until the parents’ letter
of November 22, 2004.
The District also points out that its child find efforts, in
this case and in other cases, are comprehensive:  it routinely
posts child find notices in the local paper, makes the information
available on its website, and sends residents the information in
their tax bills.  Targeted posters and pamphlets are placed in
private schools.  The Pennsylvania Department of Education
was satisfied that the District was 100% compliant with its child
find obligations during the relevant time.  The District Court
was convinced that the District’s child find activities were
appropriate; we are as well.
    4.   Free and Appropriate Public Education
Every disabled student is entitled to an FAPE under the
IDEA.  20 U.S.C. § 1412.  It must be specially designed to meet
the unique needs of that child, be provided under public
supervision and direction. and be provided at no cost to the
parents.  The Hearing Officer, the Appeals Panel, and the
District Court all agreed that the IEP and the ER were
appropriate and met IDEA requirements.  The plaintiffs argue
that the District denied Patrick a FAPE because the ER did not
identify him as having a learning disability in math computation
and did not assess his social and emotional functioning.  As the
Appeals Panel found, those areas were not identified as
suspected disabilities and so were properly excluded from the
ER.  Based on the record, the District’s evaluation of Patrick
and the IEP it offered him were substantively appropriate and
reasonably calculated to provide a meaningful educational
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Forest Grove School4
District v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009), addressed the issue of
whether plaintiffs may be reimbursed for private special
education services when the student is unilaterally placed in a
private institution.  The Court held that, under the IDEA, such
services merited reimbursement if the public institution did not
provide a FAPE, even if the student had never received special
education services at the public institution.  Forest Grove is not
relevant to the situation here, where the District did not deny the
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benefit.  We agree with the District Court that the District met
the FAPE requirements of the IDEA.
    5.  Tuition Reimbursement and Compensatory
Education 
The plaintiffs seek tuition reimbursement for Patrick’s
placement at Benchmark during the summer of 2005 and the
2005-2006 school year, based on their allegations that the
District’s ER and IEP were inappropriate.  
The IDEA requires the state to reimburse parents for
private school tuition in some situations where the school “had
not made a free appropriate education available to the child in
a timely manner prior to that enrollment.”  20 U.S.C. §
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii); see also Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v.
Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 532 (2007); Florence
County Sch. Dist. v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 13 (1993).  No
reimbursement is required if the school offered a FAPE and the
parents placed the child in a private school anyway.   The4
student a FAPE and where the student not only never received
special education services from the District, but was never
enrolled in the District in the first place.  
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Hearing Officer, the Appeal Panel, and the District Court all
found that the District offered a FAPE.  We agree.
In the alternative, the plaintiffs seek compensatory
education based on events from the 2002-2003 school year
through the 2004-2005 school year.  “‘A disabled student’s right
to compensatory education accrues when the school knows or
should know that the student is receiving an inappropriate
education.’”  Lauren W. v. Deflaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 272 (3d
Cir. 2007) (quoting Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 250)).  The right to
compensatory education arises not from the denial of an
appropriate IEP, but from the denial of appropriate education.
Ridgewood, 172 F.3d at 250.  
As we have stated above, the District did not receive
notice that Patrick needed evaluation for special education
services until November of 2004, so the plaintiffs’ claims for
compensatory education before that point must fail.  Moreover,
as we have discussed above, a procedural violation cannot
support a compensatory education claim, so the fact that there
was a delay in providing the evaluation and IEP to the plaintiffs
cannot sustain their compensatory education claim, because
Patrick’s substantive rights were not affected.  See, e.g., Me.
Sch. Admin. Dist., 321 F.3d at 19 (holding that “compensatory
education is not an appropriate remedy for a purely procedural
violation of the IDEA”).  
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Further, compensatory education is not an available
remedy when a student has been unilaterally enrolled in private
school.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.137,
300.138, 300.148(c); In re The Educational Assignment of J.D.,
Spec. Educ. No. 1120, at 14 (Pa. Spec. Educ. Appeals Panel
2001), available at http://odr.pattan.net/ODRapps/App1120.pdf
(“[T]uition reimbursement and compensatory education are two
distinct remedies.  They are not interchangeable.  Tuition
reimbursement is a remedy to parents who have unilaterally
placed their child in a private school when a district offers their
child an inappropriate educational placement and the proposed
IEP was inappropriate under the IDEA thereby failing to give
the child FAPE.  In contrast, compensatory education is a
retrospective and in kind remedy for failure to provide an
appropriate education for a period of time.” (citations omitted)).
As the Appeals Panel noted, the record shows that Patrick
has never been enrolled in public school.  Therefore,
compensatory education is not an available remedy.  
    6.  Reimbursement for IEEs and Vision Therapy
A parent has the right to an IEE at public expense if the
parent disagrees with the evaluation obtained by the school.  34
C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(1); Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 60
(2005).  The plaintiffs seek reimbursement for the 2003 and
2005 IEEs that they obtained privately, and for vision therapy
they obtained privately from July 2003 through March 2004.  
The plaintiffs may not receive reimbursement for the
2003 IEE and the 2003-2004 vision therapy because Patrick
  Compare Tereance D. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila, 570 F.5
Supp. 2d 739 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (holding that the application of
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received those services before the District knew or should have
known that Patrick needed evaluation for special education
services.  The 2005 IEE is not eligible for reimbursement
because the parents had already made an appointment for the
IEE when they requested District evaluation.  The Hearing
Officer, Appeals Panel, and District Court all held that because
the parents were not challenging the District’s evaluation, the
District was not responsible for reimbursement.  We agree.
D.  IDEA Statute of Limitations
The District Court applied the two-year statute of
limitations from IDEA-2004 to the plaintiffs’ claims, barring
claims arising before October 5, 2003.  The plaintiffs claim that
this is an unlawful retroactive application of the limitations
period, citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265
(1994).  The District argues that the District Court properly
barred the pre-October 5, 2003, IDEA claims because the
amendments were in effect on October 5, 2005, when the
parents initiated their due process request. 
The issue of whether IDEA-2004’s two-year statute of
limitations applies to cases where the underlying events took
place before IDEA-2004’s effective date is an important one,
and one that our court has not yet addressed.  A number of our
district courts have dealt with the issue, and reached different
results.   However, we will not reach that issue today, because5
IDEA-2004’s two-year statute of limitations to the plaintiffs’
compensatory education claims arising before the statute’s
enactment was impermissibly retroactive under Landgraf), J.L.
v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., No. 06-1652, 2009 WL 1119608
(W.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2009) (same), and Steven I. v. Cent. Bucks
Sch. Dist., No. 08-571, 2009 WL 415767 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 18,
2009) (same), with Evan H. v. Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch.
Dist., No. 07-4990, 2008 WL 4791634 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2008)
(holding that the statute of limitations bars claims that arose
prior to its enactment), and Sch. Dist. of Phila v. Deborah A.,
No. 08-2924, 2009 WL 778321 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2009)
(same).
 Because we decline to rule on the IDEA statute of6
limitations issue, we will not address whether either of the two
exceptions to the statute of limitations— specific
misrepresentations or withholding of information by the
District—apply.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(D).
28
whether or not we apply the two-year statute of limitations, all
of the plaintiffs’ claims that are supported by the record were
timely filed.  There are no claims that pre-date the notice given
in November 2004, and the plaintiffs filed their due process
request in October of 2005, so there is no real issue of the statute
of limitations or its retroactivity here.  Any ruling on the statute
of limitations would be purely advisory.  Notwithstanding the
parties’ desire for us to do so, we decline to opine on this issue
when it is not implicated in the case before us.6
Accordingly, we will REVERSE the District Court’s
29
ruling with respect to the applicability of the Pennsylvania
personal injury statute of limitations to the plaintiffs’ claims
under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, but will AFFIRM its
order granting summary judgment to the District.
